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I. INTRODUCTIONWHILE Texas is generally viewed as a pro-property and constitu-
tional rights state, Texas courts have tended to uphold govern-
mental regulations that impinge on those rights. However, the
only important Texas Supreme Court land use opinion during the Survey
period struck down a city's attempt to prevent the free exercise of relig-
ion. Texas courts continue to struggle with determining the appropriate
breadth and scope of governmental regulation of private property.
This article presents the key zoning and land use developments from
the Survey period under the topic areas of zoning and platting, inverse
condemnation, and annexation.
II. ZONING AND PLATIING
A. CIrY PROHIBITED FROM IMPINGING ON PRACTICE OF RELIGION
In Barr v. City of Sinton, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether
a zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of correctional rehabilitation
facilities in defined areas violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (TRFRA). At issue in this case was Barr's operation of a half-
way house where he offered housing, religious guidance, and counseling
to individuals recently released from prison as part of a religious ministry
supported by Barr's church. Following Barr's public discussions regard-
ing his ministry, the City passed a zoning ordinance that effectively pro-
hibited Barr from operating his ministry anywhere within the City of
Sinton.2 Barr eventually sued the City under the TRFRA, seeking,
among other things, a declaratory judgment.3 Ruling in favor of the City,
the trial court held "that the ordinance did not violate [the] TRFRA"
because the zoning ordinance (1) "did not substantially burden Barr's . . .
free exercise of religion," (2) furthered a compelling governmental inter-
est, and (3) "was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest."4
The court of appeals affirmed. 5
In applying the TRFRA and modifying the trial court's three-part test,
the supreme court set out the following four questions: (1) "Does the
City's Ordinance 1999-02 burden Barr's 'free exercise of religion' as de-
fined by [the] TRFRA? [(2)] Is the burden substantial? [(3)] Does the
ordinance further a compelling governmental interest? [(4)] Is the ordi-
1. 295 S.W.3d 287, 289-90 (Tex. 2009).
2. Id. at 287, 289.
3. Id. at 292-93.
4. Id. at 293.
5. Id. (citing Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 334, 344 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2005), rev'd, 295 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2009)).
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nance the least restrictive means of furthering that interest?" 6
With respect to the first question, the supreme court "defined 'free ex-
ercise of religion' [under the TRFRA] as 'an act or refusal to act that is
substantially motivated by sincere religious belief."' 7 The supreme court
confirmed that the TRFRA guarantees such protection, comparing the
treatment of a halfway house that is operated for a religious purpose ver-
sus one that is not to that of a bible-study group versus a book club.8 On
this issue, the supreme court concluded "that Barr's ministry was 'sub-
stantially motivated by sincere religious belief,"' affirmatively answering
the first of the four questions. 9
In answering the second question about whether Barr's free exercise of
religion was substantially burdened, the supreme court applied the stan-
dard that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set
forth in Adkins v. Kaspar,'0 which held that a "substantial burden" is
created "if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his relig-
ious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs."" The su-
preme court reasoned that the City's zoning ordinance effectively put an
end to Barr's ministry by prohibiting him from operating his ministry on
his property.12 Although the court of appeals had concluded that "noth-
ing in the ordinance preclude[d] Barr from providing his religious minis-
try" elsewhere, there was "no evidence of any alternate location in the
City of Sinton where the ordinance would have allowed Barr's ministry to
operate."' 3 Accordingly, the supreme court held that the City's zoning
ordinance substantially burdened Barr's ministry. 14
As to the third question, the supreme court noted that the TRFRA
"places the burden of proving a compelling state interest on the govern-
ment."15 In this case, the supreme court rejected the City's contention
that "[z]oning itself is a compelling state interest" because zoning ordi-
nances are not "per se superior" to the free exercise of religion.16 In
addition, the supreme court also noted that "the City's argument is un-
dercut by the fact that it made no effort to enforce [the ordinance] for
over a year after it was adopted."' 7
Finally in addressing the fourth question, the supreme court concluded
that the "TRFRA requires that even when the government acts in fur-
therance of a compelling state interest, it must show that it used the least
6. Id. at 299.
7. Id. at 300 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001(a)(1) (Vernon
2004)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 301.
10. 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004).
11. Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 301 (quoting Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570).
12. Id. at 302.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 307.
16. Id. at 305-06.
17. Id. at 307.
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restrictive means of furthering that interest."18 The supreme court held
that even if the City had a compelling interest, the City put forth no evi-
dence to show that it employed the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.19 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the judgment of
the court of appeals, holding that ordinance 1999-02, as applied to Barr's
ministry, did indeed violate the TRFRA.20
While Texas courts have generally not been proactive in protecting pri-
vate property rights, they continue to assist parties whose First Amend-
ment rights are violated. Barr is an example of the supreme court
ensuring that governmental entities do not infringe on First Amendment
religious rights.
B. TEN-DAY DEADLINE FOR APPEALING BOARD OF APPEALS
DECISION IS JURISDICrONAL
Chapter 211 of the Texas Local Government Code establishes the pro-
cedures for approving and appealing zoning variances. In Boswell v.
Board of Adjustment and Appeals of Town of South Padre,21 landowners
appealed a trial court's dismissal of a petition for a writ of certiorari, in
which the landowners sought district court review of the Board's decision
that granted zoning variances to a developer. 22 The landowners argued
that the variances "were granted without a unique showing of hard-
ship." 23 The petition alleged that the Board "exceeded its authority" in
granting the variances and that the town employees misled the landown-
ers, who received no notice of when the Board filed its decision.24 The
Board argued that the landowners did not present their petition within
ten days of the Board's filed decision, as section 211.011(b) of the Texas
Local Government Code requires. 25 The district court granted the
Board's motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and the landowners
appealed. 26
The landowners argued that the trial court incorrectly ruled that it
lacked jurisdiction and that the Board should be estopped from enforcing
the variances because it misled the landowners.27 On the jurisdictional
issue, the landowners argued that the ten-day provision in section
211.011(b) was "procedural rather than mandatory and jurisdictional." 2 8
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals did not agree, because the statute
"states that the petition 'must' be presented within ten days" and "the
18. Id. at 308.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. No. 13-08-642-CV, 2009 WL 2058914, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 16,
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word 'must' creates . . . a condition precedent." 29 The court of appeals
further explained that the Texas Supreme Court in Tellez v. City of
Socorro3 0 "stated that jurisdiction exists once a party files a petition
within ten days," which "strongly suggests . .. that the ten day require-
ment is jurisdictional."3 ' In addition, the court of appeals relied on an-
other Texas Supreme Court case, Davis v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,32
in which the supreme court stated that "[o]nce a party files a petition
within [the ten-day period], the court has subject matter jurisdiction."3 3
Because the supreme court considered the ten-day requirement to be ju-
risdictional, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction.34
Having ruled in favor of the Board on the jurisdictional question, the
court of appeals moved on to the landowners' estoppel claims.35 The
court of appeals noted that Texas law generally prohibits a court from
"acquir[ing] subject-matter jurisdiction through estoppel." 36 Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals overruled the landowners' estoppel claims and
affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.37 The court
of appeals expressed no sympathy towards the landowners' equitable po-
sition that the city staff effectively prevented them from filing their ap-
peal within the ten-day period.
C. CONFLICTING EVIDENCE SUPPORTS BOARD'S FINDING OF No
NONCONFORMING USE
The Board of Adjustment is the fact finder on zoning appeals. In Tellez
v. City of Socorro,3 8 the El Paso Court of Appeals determined that the
Board of Adjustment (the Board) of the City of Socorro (the City) did
not abuse its discretion by denying a request for nonconforming use
based upon conflicting evidence.39 The court of appeals considered the
case following remand by the Texas Supreme Court.40 In 1988, Tellez
purchased an unzoned piece of property adjacent to his existing auto-
parts business. Tellez used the property to store salvaged cars and auto
parts and allowed trucks to park on the property in exchange for pay-
ment. In 1989, the City enacted an ordinance restricting wreckage and
junkyards to industrial districts and zoned Tellez's property as
residential. 41
29. Id. at *2.
30. 226 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. 2007).
31. Boswell, 2009 WL 2058914, at *2 (quoting Tellez, 226 S.W.3d at 414).
32. 865 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1993).
33. Boswell, 2009 WL 2058914, at *2 (quoting Davis, 865 S.W.2d at 942).
34. Id.
35. Id. at *3.
36. Id. (citing Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d 293, 294 (Tex.
2001)).
37. Id.
38. 296 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2009, pet denied).
39. Id. at 652.




Several years later, the City sent Tellez zoning violation notices "alleg-
ing that he was storing junk on a residential lot."4 2 The City advised Tel-
lez that he must produce evidence to support a legal nonconforming use
(i.e., a use that existed legally when the zoning restriction became effec-
tive and has continued to exist). Tellez could not provide such support
and, as an alternative, attempted to have the property rezoned from resi-
dential to industrial. The city planning commission denied Tellez's rezon-
ing request. Then Tellez appealed to the city council, which heard and
denied his appeal. Finally, the Board voted to deny his request. Tellez
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the trial court affirmed the
Board's decision.43
On appeal to the El Paso Court of Appeals, Tellez claimed "that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying him a non-conforming use."44
The court of appeals applied "a legal presumption in favor of the
[Board's] order and [Tellez had] the burden of establishing that the Board
clearly abused its discretion." 45 In order to establish this burden, Tellez
must "demonstrate that the Board acted arbitrarily and unreasonably." 4 6
The court of appeals held that the Board did not abuse its discretion.47
Based on the record reviewed, the court of appeals stated that the Board
"heard conflicting evidence" as to (1) whether Tellez used the property as
a wrecking or junkyard when the City enacted the ordinances and (2)
whether Tellez continually used the property as a wrecking or junkyard
after the City enacted the ordinances. 48 The court of appeals reasoned
that "[a] board of adjustment does not abuse its discretion by basing its
decision on conflicting evidence." 49 Since "Tellez failed to carry his bur-
den of establishing that the [Board] abused its discretion by denying his
request for a non-conforming use," the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.5 Tellez stands for the proposition that the
decision of the board of adjustment will usually be upheld unless there is
no evidence to support the claim or the issue can be decided as a matter
of law.
D. CONFLICTING EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO UPHOLD DENIAL OF
DEMOLITION REQUEST
A result similar to Tellez was recorded in Christopher Columbus Street
Market LLC v. Zoning Board of Adjustments of Galveston,51 in which the
Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered the denial of a permit
42. Id.
43. Id. at 647-48.
44. Id. at 648.
45. Id. at 649.
46. Id. at 652.
47. Id. at 651.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 652.
51. 302 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
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to demolish a historic structure. The historic property consisted of a
home constructed in 1880 with two additions made in 1920. As an his-
toric property, approval of the landmark commission was necessary to
obtain a demolition permit. The property owner initially applied to de-
molish only the additions, and this permit was approved. However,
shortly after this approval, the property owner's structural engineer de-
termined that the main structure was unsafe, and furthermore, that the
additions could not be demolished without damaging the main structure.
Then the property owner made another application to the landmark com-
mission for demolition of the main structure. 52
Thereafter, the city presented its own structural engineer to rebut the
property owner's engineer. The landmark commission sided with the city
and denied the permit. The property owner appealed this decision to the
board of adjustment, which upheld the decision of the landmark commis-
sion based on the findings of the city's structural engineer. The property
owner then filed a writ of certiorari to the district court, but the district
court found no abuse of discretion by the board of adjustment. 53
The property owner appealed the district court decision with no luck as
well. The court of appeals held that "[f]or the property owners to prevail
in their attack on the legality of the Zoning Board's order, they had to
prove that the Zoning Board could have reached but one decision and
not the decision it made."54 The findings of the city's structural engineer
were enough to uphold the district court's decision.55
The court of appeals continued in the vein of extreme deference to
public bodies such as landmark commissions and boards of adjustment.
So long as there is some evidence to support a board's decision, the court
of appeals will uphold it.
E. Ciry's TREE ORDINANCE CAN BE EXTENDED TO ETJ
Chapter 212 of the Texas Local Government Code authorizes a munici-
pality to extend its subdivision ordinance to its extraterritorial jurisdiction
(ETJ).56 Texas cities have become more aggressive in recent years in ex-
tending their ordinances beyond their corporate boundaries.
In Milestone Potranco Development, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio,57 the
San Antonio Court of Appeals construed a city ordinance that extended
the City's tree protection regulations to land outside its corporate limits.
Milestone Potranco Development, Ltd., challenged the applicability of
the City's Tree Preservation Ordinance and Streetscape Tree Planting
Standards (Tree Ordinance) to property located in the City's ETJ. The
court of appeals concluded that the City properly adopted the Tree Ordi-
52. Id. at 410-11.
53. Id. at 412.
54. Id. at 418.
55. Id. at 419.
56. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 212.002-.003 (Vernon 2008).
57. 298 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. denied).
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nance and could extend it to the City's ETJ.58
In construing the ordinance, the court of appeals looked at "the plain
language of the [statute] unless a contrary intention or absurd result is
apparent from the context."59 The City contended that pursuant to sec-
tion 212.002 of the Local Government Code (the state platting statute), it
"may adopt rules governing plats and subdivisions of land within the mu-
nicipality's jurisdiction to promote the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the municipality and the safe, orderly, and healthful develop-
ment of the municipality." 6 0 A city may generally extend the application
of municipal ordinances to the ETJ, subject to a few exceptions.61 One
such exception is that "a municipality shall not regulate the use of any
building or property for business, industrial, residential, or other pur-
poses" in the ETJ.6 2
Milestone argued that the Tree Ordinance was an aesthetic regulatory
scheme that did not regulate basic infrastructure and, therefore, was not a
"rule governing plats and subdivisions of land" under section 212.002 of
the Local Government Code.63 The court of appeals disagreed, holding
that under section 212.002, a municipality is authorized to adopt rules
that "promote the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the munici-
pality and the safe, orderly, and healthful development of the
municipality."64
After reviewing the statement of purpose of the Tree Ordinance, which
explained the objectives and purposes it intended to accomplish, the
court of appeals held that the Tree Ordinance was more than an aesthetic
regulation and was intended "to promote the health of the municipality
and the orderly and healthful development of the community," and there-
fore section 212.002 of the Local Government Code governed.65
Milestone alternatively claimed that the Tree Ordinance was overly
broad in its application because it "appli[ed] not only to those [who
wanted] to plat and subdivide property, but also to every person who
simply want[ed] to reduce the number of trees on his or her property." 66
The court of appeals considered the Tree Ordinance in the context of the
entire Unified Development Code of which it is a part.67 The court of
appeals determined that the Tree Ordinance was limited to development
and did not purport to regulate property on which the construction of a
home was already complete, and therefore was not overly broad in its
58. Id. at 248.
59. Id. at 243.
60. Id. at 243-44 (quoting TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §212.002 (Vernon 2008)).
61. Id. at 244 (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 212.003).
62. Id. (quoting TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 212.003).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 245.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.
2004)).
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application. 68
The court of appeals then turned to the question of whether one of the
exceptions to extending the Tree Ordinance to the ETJ applied. "Mile-
stone argue[d] the Tree Ordinance should be treated as a prohibited 'land
use' regulation under subsection 212.003(a)(1), which contains an excep-
tion that prohibits a municipality from regulating, 'the use of any building
or property for business, industrial, residential or other purpose.'"69 The
court of appeals held that the Tree Ordinance did not regulate the use of
property as section 212.003 intended. 70 After analyzing the Code's lan-
guage describing the exceptions to extending ordinances as well as "the
similarities between the zoning ordinances a municipality may adopt and
the list of items a municipality is prohibited from regulating under section
212.003," the court of appeals reasoned that the legislature intended to
"prohibit a municipality from regulating zoning-type uses in the ETJ."71
The legislative amendments to the vested rights statutes provided the
court with further indication that a municipality may not regulate zoning-
type uses under section 212.003.72 The court of appeals recognized a de-
veloper's vested rights under the Local Government Code, requiring a
regulating agency to consider a permit application "based on regulations
and ordinances in effect at the time the original application [was] filed."73
In recent years, legislative amendments "clarif[ied] that while zoning reg-
ulations are excepted from the vested rights statutes, regulations gov-
erning tree preservation [were] not excepted." 74 The court of appeals
"liken[ed] tree preservation ordinances to other land development regu-
lations that govern plats and subdivisions as opposed to zoning ordi-
nances governing the use of property."75 The court of appeals also
looked at applicable case law and made a distinction between zoning on
one hand and planning or platting on the other, the latter of which "con-
template[d] adequate provision for orderly growth and development." 76
The court of appeals, held "[Tihe Tree Ordinance does not regulate the
physical use of the land or the specific purpose for which it is used but
regulates the manner in which trees must be preserved in developing the
land for any use or purpose."77
Municipalities are increasingly taking the opportunity to extend their
ordinances outside corporate boundaries. For example, several cities now
enforce their building codes in the ETJ. Milestone provides additional
68. Id. at 246-47.
69. Id. at 247 (quoting TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 212.002 (Vernon 2008)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 248.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Act of April 27, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 31, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws
40, 41).
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Lacy v. Hoff, 633 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
77. Id. at 248-49.
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support for the proposition that ordinances can be extended to affect
landowners who do not enjoy the benefit of receiving city services.
III. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
A. STOP-WORK ORDER CAN BE POTENTIAL TAKING
Most of the opinions on inverse condemnation during the Survey pe-
riod focused on procedural issues. Cities typically file a plea to the juris-
diction in order to prevent a plaintiff from reaching trial on a takings
claim on the merits.
In City of Carrollton v. McPhee, the Dallas Court of Appeals consid-
ered the issues of governmental immunity and ripeness in relation to
McPhee's claim for inverse condemnation and ultimately affirmed the
trial court's order denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction.78 "Govern-
mental immunity protects a City from suit when it exercises its govern-
mental functions unless the immunity is clearly waived." 79 But because
the Texas constitution "waives governmental immunity for a valid inverse
condemnation claim," the governmental immunity issue in this case turns
on whether McPhee asserted a valid claim for inverse condemnation.s0
McPhee owned commercial property in the City on which he operated
an automobile business. 81 In connection with a desired remodel of his
business space, McPhee presented plans to the City, and the City ap-
proved his plans and issued a permit for the work.82 After McPhee com-
menced with the approved remodeling work, but before he completed it,
the City revoked McPhee's permit and served him with a stop-work or-
der.8 3 To apply for a new permit, the City required McPhee "to submit
new drawings with significantly more rigorous construction require-
ments."8 4 McPhee claimed that he would not have pursued the remodel-
ing project "if he had known about these more rigorous standards when
he first applied for a permit."85 McPhee sued the City for, among other
claims, inverse condemnation, and the City responded by filing "a plea to
the jurisdiction asserting that [(1)] governmental immunity barred
McPhee's claims and [(2)] McPhee failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies."86 The trial court partially granted the City's plea, dismissing
all of McPhee's claims except his inverse condemnation claim.87 The City
appealed.
78. No. 05-08-01018-CV, 2009 WL 2596145, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 25, 2009,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
79. Id. at *2 (citing City of Dallas v. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d 266, 271-72 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2006, no pet.)).
80. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation
Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001)).
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The City's first issue on appeal was that McPhee failed to establish an
intentional act resulting in a public-use taking.88 The court of appeals
stated that a compensable regulatory taking can occur when a govern-
mental agency denies a permit for development. 89 And the court of ap-
peals further stated that "public use is not a necessary component of a
regulatory taking." 90 In analyzing the facts of this case (and liberally con-
struing McPhee's pleadings in his favor as Texas Department of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda required91), the court of appeals held that McPhee's
allegations did in fact assert a valid taking claim and resolved the City's
first issue against it.92
The City's second issue on appeal was that McPhee's claim was not ripe
for adjudication because McPhee failed to exhaust available administra-
tive remedies. 93 Although both parties agreed that McPhee never filed
an administrative appeal of the City's stop-work order, the trial court's
evidence "raised a fact issue with respect to whether such an administra-
tive appeal existed." 94 Based on the record, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the City had not met its burden of showing that McPhee
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and resolved the City's sec-
ond issue against it as well. 9 5 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed. 96
While many takings claims never make it to trial because of procedural
obstacles, this court of appeals went to great lengths to ensure that the
property owner would have his day in court. McPhee also shows that the
denial or revocation of a permit can constitute an intentional government
act to support an inverse condemnation claim.97
B. FLOODPLAIN ORDINANCE ALLOWING DEVELOPMENT NOT PRIMA
FACIE TAKING
During the last Survey period, the Houston First Court of Appeals held
that a Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) map revi-
sion, standing alone, that resulted in a taking, was ripe for adjudication in
City of Houston v. O'Fiel.98 In 2007, the O'Fiels filed suit against the City
after FEMA approved new maps that placed their property in the flood-
way. They argued that the City's floodplain regulations resulted in a tak-
ing because the City's code prohibited all property development within
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998)).
90. Id. (citing City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d 238, 244
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied)).
91. 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
92. McPhee, 2009 WL 2596145, at *2.




97. Id. at *2.
98. No. 01-08-00242-CV, 2009 WL 214350, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan.




The court of appeals pointed out that a challenge to a land use regula-
tion can be on its face or as applied to a particular development.'oo The
O'Fiels' claim was based on the theory that, in their case, the City's code
amounted to an unconstitutional taking.101 As a result, the court of ap-
peals held that "the issue of whether the Code constituted an unconstitu-
tional regulatory taking of the O'Fiels' property was ripe for
adjudication."1 0 2
City of Houston v. HS Tejas, Ltd. addresses the City's subsequent
amendment to its floodway ordinances.103 In September 2008, HS Tejas
brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Houston al-
leging that the amendment to the City's ordinance regulating develop-
ment in floodways, when applied to its property, resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of its property that was located in the floodway
for the first time following FEMA's 2007 adoption of new flood insurance
rate maps.10 4 "The City also filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending
that, although HS Tejas alleged that it acquired the property for the pur-
pose of developing it and selling it, HS Tejas did not allege any specific
improvement or sale that was impacted by the 2006 amendment."s0 5 The
trial court denied the City's plea.106 Upon review, the Houston First
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, holding that HS Tejas
failed to allege a concrete injury sufficient to establish that the claim was
ripe for adjudication.10 7
In July 2008, however, the City amended its floodplain ordinance, re-
moving the absolute floodway prohibition and giving the City greater dis-
cretion to issue development permits for floodway property. 08 In
assessing the case, the court of appeals agreed with the City's argument
that HS Tejas's claim, which was "based solely on a hypothetical possibil-
ity of improving or selling its property between the effective dates of the
2006 and 2008 amendments, [did not assert] the type of specific injury
sufficient to support a regulatory takings claim."109 The court of appeals
stated that "[a] case is not ripe when the determination of whether the
plaintiff has a concrete injury depends on contingent or hypothetical
facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass.""10 The court of
appeals concluded that because HS Tejas had not specifically alleged
99. Id.
100. Id. at *3 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
494 (1987)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at *6.
103. 305 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Tex. App--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
104. Id. at 182.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 185.
108. Id. at 181 (citing Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances § 19-43 (2009)).
109. Id. at 184.
110. Id. (citing Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. 2000)).
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some actual development or sales plan that the 2006 amendment im-
peded before the passage of the less restrictive 2008 amendment, HS
Tejas failed to allege a concrete injury sufficient to support a regulatory
takings claim.'
HS Tejas argued that the decisions of the Houston First Court of Ap-
peals in City of Houston v. O'Fiel and City of Houston v. Noonan, which
both involved identical challenges to the City's 2006 amendment to the
ordinance, should apply.112 The court of appeals distinguished the HS
Tejas case by stating that it upheld the trial court's denial of the City's
plea to the jurisdiction on ripeness grounds in both of those other cases
because the plaintiffs in those cases alleged a concrete injury, where HS
Tejas had not.113 Because HS Tejas "made no allegation of any specific
plans for improvement or sale that were adversely affected by the 2006
amendment," HS Tejas alleged no concrete injury and thus failed to prop-
erly establish its cause of action.' 1 4
C. ORDERED DEMOLITION OF SUBSTANDARD BUILDINGS NOT A
TAKING
Many home rule cities have passed ordinances requiring multifamily
developers and owners to maintain their structures to certain standards.
If the buildings are maintained in a substandard condition, then they can
be ordered to be demolished if certain due process standards are met.
In Patel v. City of Everman, Patel sued the City in an inverse condem-
nation proceeding after the City decided to demolish some of Patel's
apartment buildings that allegedly did not comply with city codes."15 The
City filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that Patel's
suit was an improper collateral attack on a city agency's ruling because,
although Patel initially attempted to enjoin the City from demolishing his
buildings, he later nonsuited his complaint.116 The trial court granted the
City's summary judgment motion, and Patel appealed.117
Upon review, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision to grant the City's motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing that Patel was collaterally estopped from bringing his suit because he
voluntarily terminated his original attack on the agency's ruling regarding
demolition of his buildings and because he did not pursue any other
means of review regarding the ruling within the thirty-day period set
forth in section 214.0012 of the Texas Local Government Code."18
Patel also argued that his challenge should not be based on the sub-
111. Id. at 184-85.
112. Id. at 185.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. No. 2-07-303-CV, 2009 WL 885916, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Apr. 2, 2009,
pet. filed) (mem. op.).
116. Id. at *1-2.
117. Id. at *2.
118. Id. at *7.
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stantial evidence rule.119 In its analysis, the court of appeals noted that,
pursuant to authority granted by chapter 214, "[clity ordinances that pro-
vide for judicial review of administrative determinations that buildings
constitute a public nuisance or otherwise provide for their demolition can
mandate the substantial evidence standard of review." 120 The court of
appeals further noted that when a city ordinance is based on chapter 214,
section 214.0012 will serve to fill in any gaps in judicial procedure where
nothing is specifically set forth in the ordinance.121 Accordingly, because
chapter 214 provided the authority for the City's substandard building
ordinance, the court of appeals held that the review provisions set forth in
section 214.0012 were applicable to Patel's claims.122
D. AGREEMENT TO BUILD IMPROVEMENTS WAIVES EXACTIONS
CHALLENGE
One of the exceptions to cities' immunity defense is the enforcement of
settlement agreements resulting from previous litigation.123 The dispute
in City of Corinth v. NuRock Development, Inc. stemmed from the al-
leged breach of a settlement agreement (the Agreement) that the parties
entered into to resolve prior litigation between them.124 Pursuant to the
Agreement, NuRock was, among other things, to construct an affordable
housing project.125 In its suit against NuRock, the City alleged that
NuRock breached the Agreement by failing to fund a required escrow
account for certain infrastructure projects.126 NuRock filed counter-
claims against the City, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and a declara-
tory judgment.127 Specifically, NuRock alleged that "the City was
interfering with and delaying [NuRock's] construction . . . by refusing to
perform inspections or issue building permits or certificates of occu-
pancy."128 The City responded by alleging sovereign immunity.129 The
trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction, and the City
appealed.130
In addressing the City's argument that it had immunity from NuRock's
claims for breach of the Agreement, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
relied on Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Lawson to support its
119. Id. at *6.
120. Id.; see TEX. Loc. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 214.001(a) (Vernon 2008); see also Cedar
Crest # 10, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 754 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ
denied).
121. Patel, 2009 WL 885916, at *6 (citing TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 214.0012
(Vernon Supp 2009)).
122. Id. at *6.
123. See City of Corinth v. NuRock Dev., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2009, no pet.).
124. Id. at 363.
125. Id. at 363-64.
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holding that the City was not immune.13 1 In that case, a plurality con-
cluded that when a governmental entity settles a claim for which immu-
nity from suit has been waived, immunity from suit is also waived for a
breach of the settlement agreement. 132
The City also challenged the trial court's jurisdiction over the matter,
arguing that NuRock's inverse condemnation claim was improper be-
cause NuRock voluntarily agreed to make the improvements (the subject
of its taking claim) pursuant to the Agreement.133 In addressing this is-
sue, the court of appeals reasoned that the City's acceptance of the im-
provements did not constitute a compensable taking under the Texas
constitution, because the City acted pursuant to colorable contract rights
set forth in the Agreement, rather than pursuant to its powers of eminent
domain.134 The court of appeals went on to note that even if it were
determined that the City breached the Agreement, it would not change
the fact that the improvements were agreed to prior to the alleged
breach, and the alleged breach would not affect a determination regard-
ing the City's intent (i.e., whether the City intended to take the improve-
ments when it executed the Agreement).135 Consequently, the court of
appeals agreed with the City and held that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over NuRock's inverse condemnation claim.136
E. PROCEDURAL CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY DOES NOT CONFER
STANDING
The Austin Court of Appeals addressed the issues of associational
standing and the sufficiency of public notice under the Texas Open Meet-
ings Act13 7 in Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping
Springs.'3 s After notice and a public hearing, the City entered into two
separate development agreements (collectively, the Development Agree-
ments), whereby two companies could develop land in Hays County,
Texas, according to agreed-upon standards.139 Save Our Springs Alli-
ance, Inc. (SOS) filed suit against the City claiming (1) the City did not
have authority to enter into the Development Agreements, (2) the public
notices did not give sufficient information, and (3) the Development
Agreements impinged on the right of self-government because they con-
tracted away legislative powers, thereby violating the Texas constitu-
131. Id. at 365-67.
132. Tex. A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518, 521-22 (Tex. 2002).
133. City of Corinth., 293 S.W.3d at 367.
134. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 644 (Tex.
2007)).
135. Id. at 367-68.
136. Id.
137. TEX. GOV'T CODE Am. § 551.041 (Vernon 2004).
138. Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871, 877
(Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. struck).
139. Id. at 876.
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tion.140 SOS sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.141
The court of appeals set forth the elements of associational standing as
follows: (1) at least one member of the association would otherwise have
standing, "(2) the interests [the association] seeks to protect are germane
to the organization's purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit."142 SOS alleged several injuries to its members, thus asserting
standing.143
SOS first alleged environmental injury on behalf of members who reg-
ularly swim in the Barton Springs pool.144 The court of appeals held that
environmental impact alone was not enough to establish injury sufficient
for standing absent an interest in property that is affected that makes the
alleged injury distinct from injury sustained by the public at large. 145
Second, SOS alleged that injury to the well water of landowners who
live near the subject land and who use the well amounted to injury suffi-
cient for standing.146 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the
alleged harm must be actual or imminent, rather than hypothetical.147
Third, SOS asserted standing based on constitutional violations.148
SOS alleged that the Development Agreements impinged on the right of
local governments to self-govern and contracted away legislative and po-
lice powers.149 The court of appeals stated that in order to establish
standing based on alleged constitutional violations, SOS must show an
injury in fact.150 The only injury that SOS alleged was a "procedural in-
jury suffered by those members who reside within the [C]ity."' 5 Conse-
quently, the court of appeals "decline[d] to hold that SOS [had] standing
based on harm to its members' non-specified procedural interests."152
Fourth, SOS alleged standing based on injury to tax-paying members
"from the City's expenditure of public funds under the [Development]
Agreements."1 53 The court of appeals held that the language in the De-
velopment Agreements did not require the expenditure of public funds
and, therefore, did not support a claim for taxpayer standing. 54
The court of appeals also addressed the sufficiency of the City's public
notice given in connection with the execution of the Development Agree-
140. Id. at 876-77.
141. Id. at 877.
142. Id. at 878.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 882.
146. Id. at 878.
147. Id. at 884.
148. Id. at 878.
149. Id. at 884.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 885.
153. Id. at 878.
154. Id.
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ments. 55 The Texas Open Meetings Act requires that a governmental
body "give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each
meeting held by the governmental body."1 56 SOS alleged that the notice
insufficiently notified the public of the subject of the meeting because it
did not alert the public to the substantial impact of the Development
Agreements.15 7 Specifically, SOS alleged the notices lacked not only
property locations that the Development Agreements affected but also
the applicable alteration time periods.158 Despite SOS's arguments, the
court of appeals held that the City's notices were sufficient under the
Texas Open Meetings Act.159 The notices sufficiently identified the par-
ties, stated that a development agreement was being considered, and ref-
erenced the section in the Texas Local Government Code that sufficiently
informed the reader of the general location of the property affected;
therefore, the court of appeals held that the notices were sufficient. 160
The opinions handed down during the Survey period on inverse con-
demnation illustrate the importance of developers or builders obtaining a
decision on a permit application and making the proper administrative
appeals prior to filing land use litigation. The plaintiff must show a spe-
cific, concrete injury to reach a trial on the merits. As the case law shows,
a litigant faces a real threat of losing its rights to pose such a challenge if
it does not jump through the correct procedural hoops.
IV. ANNEXATION
A. ANNEXATION STATUTE IN EFFECT PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF
ANNEXATION APPLIES
In Five Land, Ltd. v. City of Rowlett,161 Five Land appealed a trial
court's dismissal, for lack of standing, of a mandamus action against the
City under section 43.056(1) of the Texas Local Government Code.162
Five Land, which owned land that the City annexed in June 1998, brought
the mandamus action to enforce the terms of a service plan that the City
enacted in 1998 in an attempt to force the City to provide sewer service to
Five Land's property. 163 The City contended that Five Land, which did
not reside in the annexed area, lacked standing because, at the time of the
annexation, section 43.056(i) of the Texas Local Government Code al-
lowed residents, but not landowners, to bring a mandamus action to en-
force a service plan.'" However, effective September 1, 1999, section
155. Id. at 888.
156. TEX. Gov'T CODE Am. § 551.041 (Vernon 2004).
157. Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc., 304 S.W.3d at 888.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 890.
160. Id. at 889.
161. 293 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
162. Id. at 918.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 918-19 (citing Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1062, § 1, 1995 Tex.
Gen. Laws 5240 (codified at TEX. LOCAL Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.056(1) (Vernon 2008))).
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43.056(i) was moved to section 43.056(l) and amended to give those who
own property within municipalities having a population under 1.6 million,
but do not reside within the municipality, the right to file a mandamus
action.165
The Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether the change in section
43.056 applied to Five Land's property, which the City annexed before
the effective date of the change.166 Looking at the legislative history of
the amendment to section 43.056, the court of appeals held that the
amendment was intended to apply to (1) statutorily required annexations
included in a municipality's three-year annexation plan and (2) "annexa-
tions not required to be included in such a plan if the first public hearing
or first notice required as part of the annexation process occurred on or
after September 1, 1999."167
Since the annexation of Five Land's property was completed before the
statute was amended, the court of appeals concluded that the earlier ver-
sion applied.168 This, the court of appeals explained, was consistent with
the legislature's prior practice. 169
The court of appeals rejected Five Land's argument that the legislature
intended only to make the statute prospective with respect to procedural
requirements of annexation, stating that such an interpretation "would
make the legislature's prospective language with respect to section
43.056(l) meaningless." 170 Because the City's annexation was complete
before 1999, the court of appeals stated that the annexed "area was never
included in a three-year annexation plan," and that no "notices or hear-
ings required for the annexation occurred after the effective date of the
[amendment]."171 Thus, the court of appeals held that Five Land had no
standing and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the mandamus
action.172
B. OPPOSITION OF CONTIGUOUs LANDOWNERS CANNOT THWART
ANNEXATION
Another standing issue was addressed in Village of Salado v. Lone Star
Storage Trailer, II Ltd.173 The Village appealed the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Lone Star's voiding the Village's annex-
165. Id. at 919.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Act of May 30, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1167, § 17(c), (d) & (e), 1999
Tex. Gen. Laws 4079, 4090 (Vernon)).
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1062, §§ 1, 3, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 5240, 5241 (Vernon); Smith v. City of Brownwood, 161 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 2005, no pet.)).
170. Id. at 919-20.
171. Id. at 920.
172. Id.
173. No. 03-06-00572-CV, 2009 WL 961570 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 10, 2009, pet. de-
nied) (mem. op.).
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ation of Lone Star's property.174 The Village annexed land located im-
mediately to the east of the Village, pursuant to section 43.025 of the
Texas Local Government Code, after a majority of the qualified voters
within the area being annexed voted in favor of annexation.175 Lone
Star, which opposed annexation, owned approximately fourteen acres of
the annexed land, including all of the annexed land that abutted the Vil-
lage's boundary.176 At trial, both Lone Star and the Village filed sum-
mary judgment motions, and the district court granted Lone Star's
motion, declaring the annexation ordinance void.'77
On appeal, the Village contended that the annexation was proper, hav-
ing complied with the requirements of section 43.025.178 Lone Star did
not dispute that the Village met the procedural requirements of the Local
Government Code.179 Instead, Lone Star challenged the annexation be-
cause it owned all of the land "contiguous" to the Village and did not
consent to annexation.o80 Lone Star's argument relied on the language of
section 43.025, which provides that "a majority of the qualified voters of
an area contiguous to [the] municipality [must] vote in favor of becoming
a part of the municipality." 81
The Austin Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. First, it noted
that section 43.025 only requires a majority of the qualified voters in an
area to be annexed to vote in favor of annexation, and the Code does not
require unanimous consent.182 The statute also makes no distinction be-
tween voters who own property along a municipality's borders and those
who do not, and it contains no exception for situations where one party
owns all of the property that physically borders the municipality.' 8 3 Sec-
ond, the court of appeals explained that "Lone Star's construction of [the
statute] would frustrate the intent of the legislature and lead to arbitrary
results." 184 "Specifically, Lone Star's interpretation would deprive the
majority of voters of a right afforded them by the legislature and would
elevate the rights of owners of property abutting municipalities." 85 For
example, the court of appeals explained, under Lone Star's interpreta-
tion, even if all qualified voters but one voted in favor of annexation, that
one voter could prevent annexation if it happened to own property along
the border of the municipality.186 On the other hand, annexation would
be allowed under Lone Star's interpretation if just one voter favoring an-
nexation owned property that abutted the border of the municipality,




178. Id. at *2.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *1. (quoting TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.025(a) (Vernon 2008)).







even if a majority were against annexation.187
Lone Star also argued that the court should consider its property sepa-
rately from the remainder of the annexed land and determine whether
the requirements of section 43.025 had been met for each parcel.18 In
support of this argument, Lone Star relied on City of Waco v. City of
McGregor.189 The court of appeals distinguished McGregor, noting that
"the Village was not attempting to annex a strip of land in order to reach
property that it already owned" and that no one claimed that any part of
the land the Village sought to annex was outside of its ETJ.190 The court
of appeals thus rejected Lone Star's argument that its land and the re-
maining annexed land should be considered separately under section
43.025.191 Thus, the court of appeals reversed the district court's judg-
ment, rendered judgment that the Village's annexation was valid and en-
forceable, and remanded the case to the district court for a determination
on the issue of attorneys' fees. 192
C. CONSENT STATUTE SERVES AS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Even municipalities face procedural hurdles in challenging annexation
by other cities. City of Celina v. City of Pilot Point concerns a dispute
between the cities of Celina and Pilot Point over Pilot Point's annexation
of certain land.193 Celina brought suit in 2006, seeking to void an annexa-
tion that Pilot Point completed in 2000, on the grounds that the annexed
land extended into Celina's ETJ, the annexation improperly annexed
land that was less than 1,000 feet wide at its narrowest point, and Pilot
Point annexed land outside of its ETJ.194 Talley Ranch Management,
Ltd. (Talley), which owns a portion of the land involved in the dispute,
intervened in the case.195 Each of the parties moved for summary judg-
ment, and the trial court granted the motions of Talley and Pilot Point for
summary judgment in which they claimed that section 43.901 of the Texas
Local Government Code time-barred Celina's suit because Celina filed
the action more than two years after the annexation. 196
In its first issue on appeal, Celina argued that Pilot Point and Talley
were not entitled to summary judgment, that Celina's consent could not
be presumed, that section 43.091 does not cure any defect in Celina's an-
nexation other than the lack of consent to the annexation, and that Pilot
187. Id.
188. Id. at *4.
189. Id. (citing City of Waco v. City of McGregor, 523 S.W.2d 649, 650, 652 (Tex.
1975)).
190. Id. at *5.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. City of Celina v. City of Pilot Point, No. 02-08-230-CV, 2009 WL 2750978, at *1
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2009, pet. denied).
194. Id.
195. Id. The authors represented Talley.
196. Id. at *1-2.
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Point's annexation was void.197
In addressing Celina's first issue, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals ex-
plained that the language of section 43.091, in effect at the time of Pilot
Point's annexation, provided that an annexation ordinance is "conclu-
sively presumed to have been adopted with the consent of all appropriate
persons" if a legal challenge was not filed within a two-year time pe-
riod.198 It further explained that the "legislature amended section 43.901
[in 20011 to provide that 'all appropriate persons' [did] not include munic-
ipalities, but it did not make the amendment retroactive." 199 The court of
appeals noted that it earlier addressed this issue in 2003, and at that time
relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in City of Murphy v. City of
Parker to conclude that section 43.901 acts as "a complete bar, as a matter
of law, to any challenge after two years." 2oo In doing so, the court of
appeals rejected Celina's argument that Murphy's holding was limited
only to those challenges based on lack of consent. 201
Celina also challenged the trial court's refusal to grant Celina's motion
to dismiss Talley's intervention for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, say-
ing that Talley should not have been allowed to challenge Celina's annex-
ation ordinances. 202 But Talley, the court of appeals explained,
"intervened not to challenge Celina's ordinances[,] but as an interested
party to Celina's challenge to Pilot Point's actions" in connection with
certain annexations, including Pilot Point's development agreement with
Talley, which Celina sought to have ruled void ab initio.203 Since Celina
sought to void the Talley agreement, the court of appeals held that Talley
had a justiciable interest in Celina's suit against Pilot Point and affirmed
the trial court's ruling.204
D. BOUNDARIES CREATED BY DECADES-OLD ANNEXATIONS UPHELD
The Dallas Court of Appeals ruled against another municipal challenge
in Town of Fairview v. City of McKinney. 205 The court of appeals consid-
ered a boundary dispute between Fairview and McKinney in which Mc-
Kinney questioned the validity of several Fairview annexation
ordinances.206 Although the parties settled a portion of their dispute, a
trial was held to settle the remaining dispute involving three tracts of
land. McKinney prevailed at trial, and Fairview appealed. 207
197. Id. at *2.
198. Id. (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws




201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *5.
203. Id.
204. Id.





The court of appeals addressed the validity of annexation ordinances
passed by McKinney in 1958 and 1959 and by Fairview in 1970.208 While
the disputed tracts were not located within the boundaries of either Mc-
Kinney or Fairview, the relevant ordinances dealt with the boundaries of
the party's ETJ and thus affected each party's claims to the disputed
tracts. 209
In 1963, the Municipal Annexation Act, which first created the concept
of a municipality's ETJ, became effective.210 This Act limited "a munici-
pality's ability to annex property" to only those properties either owned
by the municipality or located within its ETJ.211 In February 1970,
Fairview passed an annexation ordinance for 200 acres of land near the
disputed tracts, but "located outside of Fairview's ETJ and .. . not contig-
uous to its city limits." 2 1 2 In March 1970, McKinney passed several an-
nexation ordinances extending its ETJ to include not only all of the
disputed tracts but also some of the 200 acres that Fairview previously
annexed. 213 Thereafter, McKinney filed the original suit against
Fairview.214
On appeal, Fairview first argued that McKinney's 1958 annexation or-
dinance was void as a matter of law for two reasons. First, "the metes and
bounds description of the annexed property set forth in the [1958] ordi-
nance [did] not close" (i.e., it was missing a metes and bounds call along
the eastern border of McKinney).215 Fairview argued, with some support
in Texas case law, that this error made the annexation ordinance void.216
But the court of appeals noted that the trial court allowed into evidence
two different versions of the ordinance, and in one of these versions the
metes and bounds description did close.217 The court of appeals rejected
Fairview's claim that only the copy containing the error should have been
allowed into evidence. 218 The court of appeals concluded that the version
of the ordinance that contained the error was not conclusive proof of the
contents of the original ordinance, and that there was evidence to support
the trial court's finding that the version containing the complete property
description accurately described the land McKinney sought to annex.219
Fairview next argued that McKinney's 1958 annexation ordinance was
void ab initio because it improperly included a 600-foot strip of land that
was already part of Fairview.220 Noting a well-established rule that no
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 464.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 465.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 466.
216. Id. (citing Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Sequin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1991)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 468.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 468-69.
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city has the authority "to annex the territory of another," 221 the court of
appeals agreed that the 1958 ordinance was void ab initio, "to the extent
it sought to annex the 600-foot strip of land."222 However, it did not
agree with Fairview that this made the entire 1958 ordinance void.2 2 3
Discussing Texas case law on annexation, the court of appeals stated that
this issue has rarely been addressed, for two reasons. First, determining
what part of a specific territory, short of its entirety, may be annexed is
generally beyond the authority of the judicial branch.224 And second,
most annexation cases involve "whether a private-party has standing to
complain of the annexation." 2 2 5 "Thus, most annexation challenges
hinge-not on whether the annexation is attacked as void in whole or in
part-but on whether the complaint asserted, if sustained, would render
the ordinance void or voidable." 226
The court of appeals relied on City of West Lake Hills v. State ex rel.
City of Austin, in which the Texas Supreme Court decided "whether a
city's original incorporation, which [attempted to improperly] incorporate
non-contiguous territories, was void in whole or in part." 227 Based on the
holding in West Lake, the court of appeals upheld the remaining bounda-
ries set by McKinney in the 1958 ordinance, concluding that the facts of
the case warranted its decision and that the court of appeals would not
usurp a home-rule city's authority to determine its own boundaries. 228
The court of appeals then turned to Fairview's second issue, claiming
that it had rights to the disputed tracts because its February 1970 ordi-
nance annexed tracts adjacent to the disputed tracts (thus extending
Fairview's "ETJ to include the disputed tracts") before McKinney passed
ordinances annexing the tracts.229 Fairview admitted that its 1970 ordi-
nance was void at the time it was adopted, since the territory it purported
to annex was neither contiguous nor adjacent to Fairview. 230 However,
Fairview argued that the Texas Legislature's 1979 Validation Act later
validated the 1970 ordinance, effective as of the date that Fairview
adopted the 1970 ordinance. 231 The court of appeals concluded that the
language of the 1979 Validation Act did not support Fairview's posi-
tion.2 3 2 The 1979 Act, the court of appeals explained, validated both the
boundary lines of the municipalities that it covered and the previous in-





225. Id. at 470.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 473 (citing City of W. Lake Hills v. State ex el. City of Austin, 466 S.W.2d
722, 727 (Tex. 1971)).
228. Id. at 474.






corporation proceedings of those municipalities. 233 But while the section
validating incorporation proceedings includes the words "as of the date
on which they occurred," the provision validating boundary lines contains
no such language.234 Thus, the court of appeals held that the 1979 Valida-
tion Act did not act to extend Fairview's ETJ into McKinney's existing
ETJ, and it upheld the trial court's judgment in favor of McKinney, modi-
fying its judgment only to reflect that McKinney's 1959 ordinance was
valid as to all but the 600-foot strip.235
E. LIMITED-PURPOSE ANNEXATION CHALLENGED AS TAKINGS
In City of Houston v. Guthrie,236 lessees and landowners claimed that
the City used limited-purpose annexations to unlawfully extend the City's
fireworks ordinances to areas outside of the city limits. After the City
entered into strategic partnerships with certain municipal utility districts,
the City annexed roads adjacent to the plaintiffs' properties. 237 Then, the
City threatened to extend its fireworks ordinances to these roadways, ef-
fectively preventing the sale of fireworks on land adjacent to these roads.
The property owners' primary cause of action was brought under the
Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (PRPRPA) found in sec-
tion 2007.001, Texas Government Code.2 3 8 The Code states, "To have
standing to bring a claim under PRPRPA, plaintiffs must be 'owners' who
allege a 'taking." 239 The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals first
held that the owners of the fireworks stands who had a lease on property
were not "owners" under the statute and therefore lacked standing. 240
On the other hand, the court of appeals held that the landowners had
standing under the PRPRPA.241
The plaintiffs also sought to have the limited purpose annexations de-
clared void. Arguing that these annexations were voidable and not void,
the City argued that the landowners did not have standing because suit
was not brought as a quo warranto action. Because the plaintiffs did not
allege substantive defects in the annexations that would render them
void, the court of appeals held that they lacked standing.242
While the plaintiffs in Guthrie successfully fought the City's attempt to
prevent their businesses from operating, the court of appeals denied their
challenge to the annexation ordinance. Guthrie is an example of the
court's refusal to overturn municipal annexations, particularly those en-
233. Id.
234. Id. (quoting Act of May 25, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 473, § 4, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws
1043, 1043-44).
235. Id. at 477-78.
236. No. 01-08-00712-CV, 2009 WL 5174258 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31,
2009, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
237. Id. at *1.
238. Id. at *34.
239. Id. at *4 (citing TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5) (Vernon 2008)).
240. Id. at *14.
241. Id. at *16.
242. Id.
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acted many years ago.2 4 3
V. CONCLUSION
Of the numerous appellate challenges to a governmental regulation
during the Survey period, only twenty to twenty-five percent were suc-
cessful, as Texas courts continued their trend of upholding municipal zon-
ing and land use decisions. The cases highlighted in this Article illustrate
the importance of plaintiffs exhausting all potential administrative reme-
dies prior to filing suit. They also show the difficulty of overturning a
governmental action unless the action is egregious.
243. Id.
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